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Abstract
Many humans believe they are separate from nature based on “unique”
characteristics. For many centuries, our advanced tool use was believed to separate us
from other animals. However, discoveries made by Jane Goodall in the 1960’s
demonstrated that humans are not unique for this capacity.1 In light of these discoveries,
the definition of human was altered to suggest that our intelligence sets us apart from
other animals. This definition has been used in order to justify our exploitation of other
animals by suggesting that we are unique, and therefore, superior due to this “unique”
intelligence. However, humans are not alone in our capacity for complex thought. Other
animals exhibit three major features of intelligence: language, episodic memory, and
theory of mind. However, homocentric methodology has denied these animals the
opportunity to demonstrate their intelligence by confining them to human-specific
standards. Only through species-specific testing can we reveal the true intellectual
capacities of other animals. Through the recognition of these commonalities, the
distinction between “human” and “other animals” can be blurred, thus aiding in
conservation efforts as humans recognize that we are not superior to animals and
therefore are not more deserving of our Earth’s resources.

1
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Portfolio Introduction
Throughout the writing of this thesis I have become more confident in the writing
process and my literary voice. My background in Ecology has meant that the majority of
my academic career has been spent writing academic scientific papers. These types of
papers are immensely structured in both the research and the writing. Scholarly scientific
papers require data collection in orderly, pre-determined ways that have little room for
flexibility. Similarly, during the writing process itself, I was trained to write in a passive,
impersonal, and jargon-laden voice. As a result of this background, I had to learn the new
language of public scientific writing. To break free from this pattern of passivity felt
immensely liberating and allowed me to explore my voice in new ways.
However as is the nature of freedom, I become overwhelmed by the vast amount
of voices I could adopt. The main model for my writing was Frans De Waal, the author of
my favorite book Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? DeWaal
discussed academic scientific research in a way that was simultaneously nuanced and
accessible. Throughout my piece I hoped to imitate this public writing style as I found it
incredibly effective and engaging. However following DeWaal too closely as a model
had its challenges. Since I knew I wanted to collect data that mirrored DeWaal’s, I fell
into the trap of starting my narrative with an answer rather than a question.
Animal equality has long been a passion of mine. This passion, coupled with my
specific vision for my piece led me to only seek out data that supports my argument. This
was dangerous as it caused my initial writing to be biased. This bias is apparent
throughout my shorter experimental pieces as I continually used small amounts of
5

evidence to make big claims about animal equality. An important shift in my research
process occurred after I changed my research question. Initially, I was exploring how
other animals’ perceived intellectual dissimilarity to humans perpetuated their
exploitation. However, after discussion with my professor Misty Beck, I shifted the focus
of my question. Instead of assuming that animals were similar to us, I shifted the
assumption to humans’ exploitation of other animals. My new question became “given
humans’ exploitation of animals, how do our perceptions of their intelligence affect their
exploitation?” Here, I am not assuming that intelligence has a particular positive or
negative affect on their exploitation as I was in my first question but instead am exploring
the relationship between these two topics.
The second pivotal moment for me was when Professor Beck taught me the
power and authority of personal narrative. Once I began exploring my personal
relationship to this new question, I began to see new opportunities for my personal
learning and growth. In my experience with academic scientific writing, I was able to
hide my insecurities behind the research of professional scientists and scholars and
impressive jargon; however, in writing a scientific piece for a public audience, these
crutches are stripped away. Instead of assuming my audience’s knowledge, I now had to
explain these specialized topics to a non-expert audience. But through this explanation, I
learned a valuable lesson. Through the detailed explanation of these concepts I was
teaching myself as well! This revelation provided me the opportunity to become more
confident in my authority as an author.
One of the pieces in which I first found a new voice was through our study of new
types of rhetoric. Through this piece, I wanted to engage my reader with the scientific
6

study while trying to keep the tone humorous and light in order to make the piece more
relatable. I truly enjoyed writing the set-up to the study as it allowed me to be more
playful with my words than I had ever been before. However, the progress I made
towards relatability nearly fully disappeared by the time I began describing the study. The
study here almost reads like a methods section of a paper, a passive tone I sought to
eliminate entirely from my final piece. Additionally, the dramatic claim for conservation
at the end of this piece demonstrates my narrow-minded focus for this study. I chose to
include this rhetoric piece in my final portfolio as it most clearly highlights my initial
challenges with translating academic scientific writing as well as my struggle with
beginning my thesis with an answer rather than a question. Through helpful feedback
from my peers, I learned that I needed to make an effort to convey only the essential
information for my reader as well to make an effort to build my conclusion logically
upon this research.
For this reason, my podcast script was a welcome challenge in brevity. Through
this piece I strove to give each word a purpose. This was a challenge as at this point in the
writing process, I was still feeling insecure about using my own voice; therefore, in being
concise, I no longer could hide behind wishy-washy words. The podcast exercise coupled
with David Hall’s discussion of “Conciseness” in Writing Well, were immensely valuable
to me during my editing process. However, the podcast demonstrates a second important
aspect of my writing journey: the exclusion of myself. If I were to rewrite this piece now,
I feel that I would be able to provide my audience more context for my motivation for
and authority over the topic.

7

Finally, my three-page paper provided me the opportunity to take advantage of
the skills I learned through the other pieces. While I believe that this piece is the most
effective out of the three, I still struggled with my overall question. The conclusion of
this piece is incredibly dramatic, especially based on the evidence provided. Here, I was
working through the major ideas of my bigger paper and allowed myself to get carried
away by my enthusiasm. Learning how to keep focus and not allowing my passion for
this topic to get the better of me, was a challenge until the end. I feel that through this
practice pieces I was able to work through, and engage with these mistakes, allowing me
to create a more effective final piece.
It is through these my questions, and failures, and determination to push on that I
found the heart of my topic. Intelligence is malleable. It does not take one form. My
history with structured academic scholarly pieces does not dictate my fate as a writer.
Just as scientists should be open to accepting new forms of intelligence across species, so
too have I discovered that I must be more open to new avenues for my creativity and
inquisitiveness. Writing this this thesis has given me the privilege to explore my literary
voice as well as improve my question-asking abilities. I am grateful for all this thesis has
taught me and I look forward to seeing where these new skills will take me in the future.

8

Introduction
The relationships between humans and animals in The Jungle by Upton Sinclair
disturbed me so profoundly that I immediately became a vegetarian. The book follows
the lives of recent immigrants to America during the early 20th century and their
traumatic introduction to the American meat industry. Sinclair does not spare any details.
Throughout the novel are vivid descriptions of masses of animals trapped nauseatingly
into overcrowded and noxious corrals while waiting for their slaughter, of their screams
of pain and fear as they were almost absent-mindedly killed, and of the animals’
carcasses being thrown around like sacks of flour by apathetic workers to begin the meat
processing. Despite these gruesome images, the nonchalance of the workers was perhaps
the most disturbing. The vast majority of these immigrants had been forced to become
desensitized from the atrocities they were committing in order to survive. But this
detached attitude towards other animals is not a relic of the 20th century. Desensitization
to the exploitation of animals remains a pillar of our society today. I felt disgusted that I
had been compliant in this system of violence. So, I quickly adopted vegetarianism in
order to attempt to amend my wrongs.
My shift to this lifestyle was met with minimal resistance from either my family
or friends, who expressed little curiosity in my moral reasoning. Whenever I alluded to
why I had become disgusted with our mal-treatment of animals, people would quickly
shut it down. It seemed that in my experience, people wanted to remain naive to their role
within this flawed system. This disturbed me. Just like the immigrants in Chicago, those
around me were choosing to remain blind to their impact on animals’ lives. I began to
wonder how this had happened and humans decided we were separate from other
9

animals? I will not attempt to speak for all of the human species. My observations and
conclusions within this paper are based solely on my experiences, academic or otherwise,
in which I have observed that humans’ well-being is consistently prioritized over that of
other animals. However, the consistency with which I have experienced this unconcern
for other animals has shocked me enough to feel that it must be addressed.
The exploitation of other animals arose from humans’ perception of their
separation from, and superiority over nature. The term “nature” was created during the
Industrial Revolution, when the creation of technology was rapidly increasing in order to
refer to all that was not human, and therefore all that could be exploited. This attitude was
the result of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of years of the evolution of tool use
which began to act as a buffer between people and their world. The increasing physical
separation between humans and their environment through man-made tools contributed to
the mental separation between humans, our environment, and other animals that later
became pervasive in culture.
This repeated exploitation led to the fabrication of the hierarchy of humans over
other animals in order to justify our exploitation of our environment. Human tool use was
the initial justification for this domination as some believed that we were uniquely human
abilities. However, Jane Goodall, the renowned primatologist shattered this illusion in the
1960’s through her discovery of chimpanzees’ use of long stems of grass to facilitate
termite collection.2 Louis Leakey, the famed paleoanthropologist who contributed greatly
to our knowledge of human evolution, responded to this discovery: “now we must

2

Goodall, Jane. The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior. 1986.
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redefine tool, redefine man, or accept chimpanzees as humans.”3 This highlights the
dangers of making exclusive definitions - one can frequently find exceptions. Since the
1960’s we have found that not only chimpanzees have been admitted into the exclusive
“tool user” club but so have monkeys, crows, and dolphins.4 5 6 But this was not enough
proof of humans’ connection to animals. Instead of recognizing parallels, we chose to
redefine what traits make us unique and therefore, superior.
Instead of being identified by our tool use, humans are now defined by our
intelligence. But to define intelligence itself is another matter. At a psychology
conference in 1921, fourteen experts came together attempt to collectively agree on a
single definition of intelligence. They failed.7 Over the course of the 20th century,
definitions of intelligence were relatively constant due to the work of two great thinkers
of the 20th century. William Wundt and William James believed that humans’ cognitive
processes are entirely different from those of other animals.8 Wundt believed that
apperception, the ability to use knowledge to comprehend the unknown, is a uniquely
human skill while animals can only utilize “simple laws of association.” 9 However, due
to the lack of data on animal cognition at the time, these conclusions were not supported
by sufficient data. For example, one of the leading papers at the time concluded that:
“[Our study] has denied the existence in animal consciousness of any important stock of
3

Peterson, Dale. Jane Goodall: The Woman Who Redefined Man. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. P. 212
Ottoni, Eduardo B., and Patrícia Izar. "Capuchin Monkey Tool Use: Overview and Implications." Evolutionary
Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 17, no. 4 (2008): 171-78.
5
Mann, Janet, Brooke L Sargeant, Jana J Watson-Capps, Quincy A Gibson, Michael R Heithaus, Richard C Connor,
and Eric Patterson. "Why Do Dolphins Carry Sponges?". PloS one 3, no. 12 (2008): e3868.
6
Hunt, Gavin R. "Manufacture and Use of Hook-Tools by New Caledonian Crows." Nature 379 (01/18/online 1996):
249.
7
Thorndike, Edward L., V. A. C. Henmon, and B. R. Buckingham. Intelligence and Its Measurement: A Symposium [in
English]. [Baltimore]1921.
8
Greenwood, John D. "Intelligence Defined: Wundt, James, Cattell, Thorndike, Goddard, and Yerkes." In Handbook of
Intelligence, 123-35: Springer, 2015.
9
Wundt, Wilhelm. "" Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology". Translated by Je Creighton and Eb
Titchener." (1894). P. 350
4
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free ideas or impulses, and so has denied that animal association is homologous with the
association of human psychology.”10 Animals were denied these abilities long into the
twentieth century.
While animal cognition has now become a field of study in its own right, humans’
desire to justify their superiority still lingers. A challenge for many scientists is their
confirmation bias. By approaching an experiment expecting to find that animals exhibit
lesser intelligence, they will unconsciously seek out evidence that supports this
hypothesis:
Our ability to think of alternative explanations for behaviors is limited to a greater
extent by our own lack of imagination than by physical or psychological
constraints on the subjects. Belief is easy to think of, but the human interest in
others’ beliefs may act as blinders that hide the true cognitive mechanisms behind
the actions, and the actions of other animals.”11
Consequently, by viewing the world only through a human-specific lens, our “objective”
studies of animal cognition are suddenly not so objective. The persistent bias in these
studies has provided ample evidence to reinforce humans’ perceived superiority.
Homocentrism, or humans’ self-interest, limits our perspective. Homocentrism
can be thought of through the lens of the geocentric universe, which placed Earth at the
center of the solar system rather than the sun. By placing Earth at the center of the
universe, scientists indicated that Earth was the most valuable body in the known solar
system. This limited perspective existed for almost two millennia, despite available
evidence to the contrary. Similarly, placing humans at the top of the animal hierarchy, we

10

Thorndike, Edward L. "Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals." The
Psychological Review: Monograph Supplements 2, no. 4 (1898): i. p. 108
11
Andrews. The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. 2014. p. 116
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are indicating that we are the most important organism and thus deserve to treat ourselves
as such. However, this is an outdated model. New research has discovered species who
are truly essential to their environment. These are called keystone species. Humans are
not one of them.
Recognizing equality between ourselves and other animals can only be
accomplished by recognizing the parallels between humans and animals. Humans share
three major aspects of intelligence with other animals: language, episodic memory, and
theory of mind. Through the exploration of these capacities I hope to draw your attention
to two key points. First, humans are not unique. Specifically, we are not unique in such a
way that justifies our exploitation of other animals. The belief that humans’ unique
characteristics are validation for our superiority is an outdated way of thinking. Second,
acknowledging other animals’ intelligence could be an effective way for humans to begin
recognizing the inherent value of other organisms. Through the appreciation of other
organisms, we will soon find that we share more in common with other animals than we
initially believed. If we are as smart as we say we are, then changing our mindset to
accept these new perspectives shouldn’t be so challenging, should it?

13

Chapter 1: Language
I was once lucky enough to go to Paris. I had long dreamed of this trip. Of warm
pastries, twinkling lights, and long evening walks down cobblestone streets with
accordion music softly playing in the background. However, through all my romantic
dreaming, I never had the practical concern about how I would communicate. My
realization hit me while standing in the middle of a busy thoroughfare, French words
swirled around me in beautiful, but unintelligible whips. At first, this was a welcome
change and it allowed me to get lost in my reverie. But as time wore on, I became
frustrated that I could not communicate easily with anybody and began to feel isolated.
One day, after hours of aimless wandering, I become lost. After frantically searching my
map, I built up the nerve to ask a passerby for directions to the metro. He earnestly tried
to gesture which turns to take but the specifics got lost in translation. While I eventually
found my way home, those moments of navigating unfamiliar streets in a exotic city
where I could not speak to anyone I felt helpless.
Language is powerful. It defines our world. But it is an exclusive club, only those
who can participate are welcome. Even simple word choice can have immense impacts
on those around us. To call a wolf a “beast,” “pest,” or “critter” will paint vastly different
images of violence greed, or gentleness. A critter would never eat your sheep but a
beastly pest? Now that’s a different story. The stories we tell matter. But sometimes these
stories are just that: fiction.
Language has effects both on our world but also on our personal lives. The ability
to communicate is an evolved behavior and has played a significant role in our survival
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as a species. Due to the perspective that humans as separate from nature, connecting
language with survival may seem like a stretch. But think of an interview. During the
course of the conversation with your potential future employer, you are attempting to
convey how qualified you are for this new job. If you got the job, you would ideally
improve your quality of life as you earned more money and built more connections which
could further your success while a failure to do so would bring less success. This could
all happen because of a single conversation which was driven by the power of language.
Through communication you can either make or break alliances (friendships, professional
relationships, romantic relationships, etc.) which may affect your prosperity in life and
more indirectly, your survival. But this is on an individual scale. The ability to
communicate also has clear impacts on the success of group living. Successful
communication can warn about predators, aid in finding a mate, or inform others about
the location and quality of food sources.12 Learning when and how to communicate
effectively is intrinsically linked with our upbringing. Because young mammals and birds
are entirely dependent on their parents in order to survive, they are in more extended
contact with their parents More time together means more time to learn. And what is
learning without some form of communication?
So, we and our fellow animals evolved language. While this much is widely
accepted by scientists, some believe that not all language was created equal. Two
revolutionary philosophers, Descarte and Noam Chomsky declared that our language
abilities are what separate us from other animals.13 Marc Hauser, a former professor at
Harvard, summarizes this perspective: “Most current commentators agree that, although
12

Hillix, William Allen, and Duane Rumbaugh. Animal Bodies, Human Minds: Ape, Dolphin, and Parrot Language
Skills. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
13
Hillex, Allen, and Rumbaugh. Animal Bodies, Human Minds: Ape, Dolphin, And Parrot Language Skils. 2013
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bees dance, birds sing, and chimpanzees grunt, these systems of communication differ
qualitatively from human language. In particular, animal communication systems lack the
rich expressive and open-ended power of human language.”14 Most notable here is the
use of the word “qualitative.” This is troubling. Does human language truly represent a
unique form of communication?
For a trait to be definitively unique, there must be substantial evidence that
demonstrates conclusively that this trait does not exist elsewhere in the animal kingdom.
This is a deceptively challenging task. Recall, for example, of the Spot-the Difference
game you may have played as a child. You are provided with two similar-looking
pictures and are asked to find differences between them. Perhaps a window disappears
from one to the other or a car may change color. Finding differences is simple enough as
you can clearly identify the specific differences between pictures. Yet now imagine that
you are provided with two pictures and are asked to prove the pictures are the same. How
can you say for certain that they are exactly the same picture? How would you support
your argument? Due to the relative ease of highlighting differences and the challenge of
illuminating similarities especially with animals with whom we cannot communicate, our
data may appear skewed.15
Data is skewed not only as a result of experimental difficulties but also inherent
bias. Some argue that due to chimpanzees lacking “essential” structures in their brain,
they could not possibly have the same language capacities as us.16 The evidence against
14

Hauser, Marc D, Noam Chomsky, and W Tecumseh Fitch. "The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and
How Did It Evolve?". science 298, no. 5598 (2002): 1569-79. p. 2
15
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch. "The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?". 2002
16
Candland, Douglas K. Feral Children and Clever Animals: Reflections on Human Nature. Oxford University Press,
1995.

16

this argument can be found within our own species. A person who becomes visually
impaired over the course of their life will frequently acquire new sensory sensitivities
they did not have before the loss of their vision. They may become more sensitive to
touch or sound, allowing them to continue to navigate the world despite this potential
handicap.17 The brain is a flexible organ. If the brain can adapt to new sensory conditions
in one lifetime, it is incredibly likely that over the course of generations through the
millennia that other animals’ brains could evolve different pathways to accomplish
similar tasks. This sentiment is supported by American psychologist Duane M.
Rumbaugh who states: “It is also possible that the fact on which the negative argument is
based is not a fact, and that chimpanzees have areas homologous to all of the speech
areas of the human brain, some of which are reduced in size or found in different
locations.”18 By only exploring areas of the brain which are homologous to humans, we
are limited ourselves to: the human perspective.
This homocentrism can be seen throughout animal linguistic studies.19 Studies
supposedly concerned with exploring animals’ capacity for language frequently involve
teaching an animal a form of human language which is then used as a marker for their
natural abilities. For example, when studying dolphin’s capacity for language, Dr.
Herman chose to avoid the use of any whistles, a natural communication tool for dolphins
in the wild, so as to “avoid confusion.”20 This is essentially the equivalent of someone
17

Hugdahl, Kenneth, Maria Ek, Fiia Takio, Taija Rintee, Jyrki Tuomainen, Christian Haarala, and Heikki Hämäläinen.
"Blind Individuals Show Enhanced Perceptual and Attentional Sensitivity for Identification of Speech Sounds."
Cognitive brain research 19, no. 1 (2004): 28-32.
18
Candland. Feral Children and Clever Animals: Reflections on Human Nature. 1995. p. 247
19
Hillix, Allen, and Rumbaugh. Animal Bodies, Human Minds: Ape, Dolphin, and Parrot Language Skills. 2013 p.
221
20
Herman, LM, RJ Schusterman, JA Thomas, and FG Wood. "Dolphin Cognition and Behavior: A Comparative
Approach." (1986).
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coming saying, “I want to see how well you speak English, so I will test you in Chinese.”
How would an animal’s ability to learn human language shed light on their natural
abilities? It can’t. If one actually wanted to learn about an animal’s capacity for language
then they should study their species- specific language. If resources are lacking for this
study, it then becomes important to take note of specific preferences or learning patterns
that study species exhibit. But even this is not done consistently. Take, for example,
David Premack, the creator of the Theory of Mind (a revolutionary topic we will explore
in the next chapter). During his studies of chimpanzee cognition, he discovered that
chimpanzees preferred to write in a top-to-bottom style rather than the traditional English
left-to-right. 21 Had he further explored the chimpanzees’ preference for vertical words,
he could have potentially provided deeper insight into their natural linguistic tendencies.
Admittedly, if scientists were to take an animal’s apparent preference into
account, it could be immensely challenging to determine the authentic meaning of these
animals’ vocalizations. Willard Quine, an American philosopher, demonstrates the
potential dangers that may arise by making assumptions of meaning. Pretend you are in a
foreign country where you have no knowledge of the language.22 You are walking with a
local when suddenly, a white rabbit runs across the path. The local next to you shouts
“gavagai!” while pointing at the rabbit. What does she mean? You may assume that
“gavagai” means rabbit. This is reasonable, but is it correct? She also could have meant
“white” or “watch out!” or “it is moving quickly!” or “shoot it!” or any number of other
potentially relevant meanings. Making an assumption of a word’s meaning can be
dangerous. In studies of animal cognition, “gavagai” has come to represent “glossing” or
21
22

Premack, David, and Ann James Premack. "The Mind of an Ape." (1983).
Quine, Willard V. "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation." The Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 6 (1970): p.
178-83.
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the assumption of the potential connection or meaning of a symbol, if there is one at all.23
It is impossible to know the true meaning of the word until it is experienced in a variety
of novel, unique situations.24 Even after which point we can still never be entirely certain
of their true meaning.
Yet despite these challenges, scientists have ventured to make several conclusions
regarding other animals’ linguistic abilities. I have selected four aspects of language
which I have designated as essential for the purpose of our study: intentional and
referential communication, vocal imitation and invention, theory of mind, and grammar.
Arguments could certainly be made for why others should be included in this list or why
some should be excluded but for now, let us proceed with these concepts in mind. These
demonstrate an animal’s ability to create, adapt, and use language in a meaningful way
that has the potential to address both their own feelings as well as the feelings and beliefs
of others. Evidence of animals’ capacity for these aspects of language would demonstrate
that humans are not in fact unique in our abilities.
First, let us explore intentional communication, which refers to an animal’s ability
to communicate information regarding a specific purpose, object, or organism. Perhaps
the most well-known example of evidence of intentional communication in animals was
Alex the African grey parrot. Alex was part of a thirty-three-year long study that explored
the capacity of non-primate animals’ had the capacity for language. Alex far surpassed
any expectation, making him the mascot of animal intelligence. Over the course of his
life, Alex learned over 80 words (this is a wider vocabulary than most 24 to 30-month

23
24

Quine, "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation." 1970.
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year old human children).25 This incredible vocabulary included many words for
identification. Throughout the study, Alex would frequently be presented with a tray of
objects varying in size, shape, color, material etc. After exploring the objects with his
tongue and beak, Irene Pepperberg, his trainer, would ask him questions about the objects
he found. He could correctly answer specific questions regarding the material a particular
object was made out of or the number of objects of a specific color. This incredible
ability to accurately describe these objects suggests that he had flexible vocabulary on
which he apply to changing experimental conditions.26 Critics suggested that Alex
obtained these skills simply through rote memorization; however, the objects he was
presented with and tested on changed so periodically that it seems unrealistic that he
would be able to recall the details of each one. Despite studies with Alex occurring in a
human language, he demonstrated that an animal does not need to look like us to
communicate effectively.
Non-verbal forms of language have been explored in studies of chimpanzees.
Chimpanzees and other primates have a different vocal cord structure from humans,
making them unable to mimic human speech.27 In order to circumnavigate these
differences, researchers have found great success with symbolic language as a satisfying
alternative to standard speech patterns. In the 1980’s Premack, Theory of Mind creator
and chimpanzee specialist, studied whether chimpanzees could be trained to
communicate using symbols to represent words.28 Each symbol’s shape and color were
25

Farkas, George, and Kurt Beron. "The Detailed Age Trajectory of Oral Vocabulary Knowledge: Differences by Class
and Race." Social Science Research 33, no. 3 (2004): 464-97.
26
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arbitrary and therefore did not provide any clue to the meaning behind the symbol.
Learning the words was a multi-step process that mimicked the verbal coaching between
a parent and their child. Sarah, one of the stars of this study, would be provided with the
symbol for “apple.” After she successfully placed it on the magnetic board, she would be
given a piece of apple as a reinforcement. Eventually, her vocabulary grew enough to
allow her to create more complex sentences. For example, Sarah learned how to request
multiple types of fruit by using multiple nouns within a sentence. “Mary give Sarah apple
orange.”29 This particular test is fascinating as it demonstrated Sarah’s flexible
understanding of these symbols.30
Now we have seen that non-human primates and other animals alike have
demonstrated their abilities to intentionally and flexibly reference objects, but what of
imitation and theory of mind? The answer to our question comes in the form of a gorilla
named Koko. Over the course of her study, Koko learned how to make 154 signs, some
of which she made up herself.31 While watching Koko play, Penny Patterson, an
American psychologist, found ample evidence for Koko’s self-awareness. Koko was fond
of a small gorilla doll which she would carry around with her throughout the enclosure.
One day, she took the doll to a corner of her enclosure and began to treat the doll as if it
were a real baby: she named the doll, “breastfed” it, and ended her games by identifying
three similar parts between the doll to herself (foot, belly button, and stomach).32 This
short interaction is loaded with important implications. First, Koko demonstrated that
29
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sign language had been so well-integrated into her life that she chose this (unnatural)
language for her play. Next, she was able to recognize herself in the gorilla doll and could
easily find parallels between their bodies, demonstrating her sense of self and her ability
to recognize another’s individuality.33 Koko’s sense of self extended into the
development of individuality. I will use “individuality” instead of “personality” in order
to avoid the perpetuating the standard that for an animal to be recognized as an individual
it must be human-like. Koko had a sense of humor! In an interaction with her trainer
Barbara Hiller she demonstrated her playful nature:
Barbara Hiller: Would you like to be able to fly like a bird?
Koko: Down.
Barbara: You’d rather stay on the ground?
Koko: Down floor.
Barbara: I think you’re smart.
(Koko laughed). 34
Finally, her creativity extended to allow her to create her own terms: “fruit lollipop”
(frozen banana), “eye hat” (mask) and many others.35 Koko’s recognition of individuality
and ability to create new words demonstrates that we are not alone in these lingual
abilities.
We have thus far found striking similarities between humans’ and other animals’
capacities for intentional communication, invention, and theory of mind; however, I
would be leading you astray if I made it appear that other animals’ language mirrored to
humans in all ways. Scientists have yet to observe animals’ use of complex grammar

33

Patterson and Cohn. "Language Acquisition by a Lowland Gorilla: Koko's First Ten Years of Vocabulary
Development." 1990
34
Patterson and Cohn. "Language Acquisition by a Lowland Gorilla: Koko's First Ten Years of Vocabulary
Development." 1990 p. 116 - 117
35
Patterson and Cohn. "Language Acquisition by a Lowland Gorilla: Koko's First Ten Years of Vocabulary
Development." 1990 p. 143

22

structures.36 So as far as we know, birds or apes cannot discuss something that happened
to them in the past. Before proceeding, I present two notes of caution on this statement.
First, through my educational experience, I found that I frequently perceived
“complexity” to be synonymous with “superior.” In both scholarly work and art, to be
“complex” seems to suggest a deeper level of thought and intelligence. But this is not the
case. Here, I am merely stating that our human grammar rules vary from the known
grammar rules of other organisms. Next, because scientists have yet to observe it does not
mean that these abilities do not exist. As we have seen, many studies of other animals’
language have been specifically regarding whether other animals can adopt human
language; therefore, animal’s may naturally have the capacity for complex grammar
structures but these abilities may not be apparent through the acquisition of human
languages.
A recent study of the Japanese great Tit (Parus minor) demonstrates the
importance of studying an animal’s natural language. Toshitaka Suzuki, a Japanese
animal behaviorist, discovered that these birds have a grammar and syntax structure
similar to humans.37 He found that these bird calls used “discrete infinity.” This is an
essential feature of language which allows an individual to construct an infinite array of
expressions from finite sources.38 Suzuki and his team found that birds would answer to
the call ABC (a call for danger) and D (an instruction to approach the caller) but would
never answer to D-ABC, suggesting phrase order plays an essential role in
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comprehension.39 If these birds have this complex ability then what other animals have
we been underestimating? Perhaps other animals’ language systems are too complex for
us to understand.
Scientific studies have provided promising evidence that we are not unique in our
capacity for language. In light of these discoveries, our obligations are simple: to
continue pursuing objective observation of other animals’ in order to gain insight into the
minds of other animals. Understanding how animals communicate can reveal an
incredible amount about their worldview. These perspectives may align with ours in
unexpected ways, and can facilitate the creation of connections between ourselves and
other animals. This respect which will arise from the recognition of these similarities
should in turn allow us to recognize the harm we have put other animals through. Other
animals use communication to facilitate their survival, yet many are struggling due to the
new challenges we have exposed them to as humans. For example, birds who live in
proximity to airports have been forced to change their calling patterns in order to
compensate for the noise of the roaring engines overhead.40 41 This is unacceptable. We
have the ability, and consequently the obligation, to communicate with each other to
create a world in which all species are valued, regardless of their abilities in arbitrary
traits such as language. Talk is cheap. Equality is better.
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Chapter 2: Episodic Memory
When I hear the song “Hungry Like the Wolf” by Duran Duran I am immediately
transported to summers of my childhood. I remember my parents playing this song during
warm evening car rides through the back roads of rural Western Massachusetts. I can see
the lush trees whirling past my window as the stars glow above me. My mind is filled
with the anticipation of the next day’s adventures playing in the lake, catching frogs, and
exploring new corners of the forest. These memories are so intrinsically linked with this
song that I cannot help but be vividly transported back these summer nights every time I
hear it. This incredible ability is called episodic memory. It’s also known as mental time
travel.42
Episodic memory enables us to remember these frivolous moments as well as
important learning moments, which could have a greater impact on our lives. For
example, when I remember how awfully sick my brother got after eating spoiled yogurt, I
am likely to be more proactive when checking the expiration dates on my food. This has
clear implications for my health. Because of episodic memory allows me to extract
important information from my memories including practical questions such as who I
was with, what I was doing, when it occurred, where I was, etc.). It’s important here to
acknowledge that self-awareness is essential for episodic memory.43 We will explore the
ability of theory of mind in a later chapter, but for now let me say that it is not an ability
that is considered to be shared by all other animals. Due to this intrinsic link, episodic
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memory is believed to be uniquely human.44 But as we have seen though our exploration
of animal language, this is a dangerous assertion. This is especially dangerous as most
studies of animals’ episodic memory abilities have only arisen within the last several
decades, meaning there is not enough comprehensive data to support this claim.
Three criteria have been developed for exploring “episodic memory” in other
animals. First, they need to be able to remember the content of what happened, where or
when. Next, the individual must be able to structure the event in the correct way by
placing it within the context of how it occurred. Finally, they must have flexibility with
this memory and be able to recall information from this memort and apply it to new
situations.45 Although the criteria may sound logical they have never been scientifically
proven to necessarily occur all at once for each instance of episodic memory.46 There is
evidence that birds, rodents and non-human primates meet the first criteria of where,
what, when.47 48 49While only birds and rodents have the flexibility to place their
memories into context.50 51 Scrub jays are the only organism that has been found to meet
all three specific criteria in an experimental setting.52
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Despite the lack of experimental scientific evidence, the structure in our brain
responsible for episodic memory, the hippocampus, is present across much of the animal
kingdom.53 Timothy Allen and Norbert Fortin, neurologists from California, recognized
that the hippocampus evolved in the common ancestor between us, non-human primates,
rodents, and birds.54 Allen and Fortin go on to describe this ancestral relative as
potentially having proto-episodic memory. I would like to pause here. As you will soon
see throughout this chapter, modern scientists have found it challenging to determine
definitively whether other organisms’ have episodic memory. For these authors to
presume to know the mental capacities of our extinct ancestor seems quite preposterous
to me. Perhaps the trait evolved slowly, or perhaps it evolved all at once. But until we can
understand this trait fully in the present day, I feel it is far too soon to make any claims.
So why do so many organisms share this structure and ability? Episodic memory
indirectly aids in our survival by making us more efficient. For example, if you and your
family found a rich berry patch, it would certainly be useful if you could recall
information about this event. Where was this patch? Did your family steal berries from
you? Using your episodic memory, you could remember that the patch was down the
river a short way and that your brother ate twice as many berries as you did, so you may
decide to go alone the next time. This increases your survival as you now have to spend
less energy searching for food as well as less energy competing for this resource.
Episodic memory also allows you to place these memories within a wider context. For
example, let’s say that it is late fall. Winter is coming and you remember how cold and
hungry you were last year. These memories may inspire you to seek out this berry patch
53
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on your own, but also to make sure to collect extra berries you can save for the colder
months ahead. Your episodic memory allowed you to escape the present moment and
anticipate your future needs despite your current feelings of satiation.
The role of episodic memory in managing food resources is so essential that it
formed the basis of a groundbreaking study on episodic memory in scrub jays
(Aphelocoma californica). Behaviorist C.R. Raby and his team studied western scrub
jays’ ability to plan for food scarcity.55 A jay was contained within a small compartment
with three chambers, each closed off from each other. In chamber A, the birds were
denied a meal in the evening and for the first several hours of the next day. During the
late morning and afternoon, the dividers between the chambers were removed to reveal to
the hungry jays a pile of powdered pine nuts in compartment B, which the they would
eagerly eat. That evening, they were stored in a different compartment (C) and were
denied dinner again as they had been in chamber A; however, in chamber C, they were
promptly provided with powdered pine nuts in the morning, reducing their hunger as
compared to their experience in chamber A. Once again, in the afternoon the dividers
were removed to reveal powdered pine nuts for them to consume in the afternoon. This
pattern repeated for several days until the researchers determined that the birds were
accustomed to the feeding schedule for each compartment. At this point, they began
providing the birds with whole pine nuts in the afternoon.56 The birds’ response to this
subtle change was immensely revealing about the intellectual capabilities of this species.
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Despite their bird brains, the jays understood the significance of the whole pine
nuts. They could be picked up! The birds began storing the nuts in the cage they
associated with more sustained hunger (cage A).57 They could remember the prolonged
discomfort they felt and they planned ahead to mitigate the effect of their hunger. What
was most remarkable about this study was that the birds were three times less likely to
store food in the cage they associated with less hunger (cage C).58 This demonstrates that
storing nuts was not the norm but rather was a direct response to their previous
experiences. This study was groundbreaking in its field as it demonstrated that these birds
were entirely capable of episodic memory. An ability, I remind you, that was believed to
be unique to humans.
A later study of scrub jays’ episodic memory revealed they were capable of
another key feature of episodic memory: flexibility. Having a flexible memory allows
animals to apply information they learned from previous experiences onto new,
potentially unique scenarios. This study had three characters: a jay who was caching food
who had previously had their food stolen by another jay (let’s call them the “wary
hider”), a jay who was caching food who had never had their food stolen by another jay
(let’s call them the “naive hider”), and a competitor who would watch the caching. If a
wary hider would re-cache their food if they were watched during the initial caching
process. By contrast, a naive hider would not re-cache its food.59 The differences between
these behaviors demonstrate that wary hiders were able to use their previous experiences
of having their food stolen in order to determine whether or not they would need to be
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suspicious of the motive of their competitor.60 The ability to apply experiences with other
competitors to unfamiliar birds, highlights the jays’ flexibility.
So now we have seen that other animals are able to recall details of previous
events and use this information flexibly. But can other animals place these events in the
context of time? This is easy for us. I can tell you something occurred on hour ago, or
thirteen years ago, and you would understand me. But can other animals understand the
concept of time even if they don’t use a clock? Yes, they can! Pigeons can tell time. Yes
pigeons, those grimy omni-present dirty birds were found to accurately understand the
time of day. Canadian neuroscientists Lisa Saksida and Donald Wilke exposed their test
pigeons to three levels of experimentation for their time-telling abilities and the pigeons
succeeded in all.61 They trained their birds to peck at different keys on the wall at specific
times. If they pecked key 1 at 9:30 am they would receive a reward, but not if they
pecked at any other key. If they pecked at only key 3 at 4:00 pm they would also receive
a reward. They found that the pigeons would consistently peck the appropriate key at the
appropriate time.62 But Saksida and Wilke remained skeptical. Was the pigeons’
consistency a result of learning that Keys 1 and 3 would alternate, so that if they last
received food from 1 they must then seek it out at 3? In order to test this hypothesis, the
researchers would occasionally fail to provide the food reward for a single time slot.
Despite this pattern shift, the pigeons would continue to peck the appropriate key in order
to receive the reward.63 Satisfied, Saksida and Wilke moved onto the final stage of their
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more rigorous testing. These experiments explored whether the pigeons were using light
cues in order to determine when to peck each key. The researchers swapped the light
patterns within the lab between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm so that before the morning feeding
it would be light and before the afternoon feeding it would be dark. Despite the time
change, pigeons would still peck Key 1 at 9:30 am and Key 3 at 4:00 pm, suggesting they
had some means of determining the correct time of day.64
Critics of this experiment argue that the scientists did not provide enough time for
the pigeons’ circadian rhythms to adapt to this change.65 Essentially, they believe the
pigeons had jet lag and were continuing to operate on their old reward schedule. This
would falsify the claim that the birds were able to place their memories within an
episodic context. I have to concede to this argument, as the birds could have continued to
operate on their old schedule. However, I believe that even taking these considerations
into account, the birds demonstrated through the other two experiments their ability to
recall the precise time of the feeding events, even when there was a disruption to the
pattern. This is sufficient evidence that the birds had some concept of time and could
consequently cater their actions accordingly for the future.
Thus far, we have only concerned ourselves with the ability to recall the past. But
the future plays a large role in episodic memory. In 2010, a Swedish cognitive zoologist
Can Kabadayi and Mathias Osvath discovered that ravens could successfully plan up to
fifteen minutes in the future 78% of the time.66 This level of future planning matches the
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abilities of a 4 or 5-year-old human child.67 These comparisons raise an interesting
question regarding cross-species standards. Some scientists, such as the Canadian
psychologist William A. Roberts believes that due to the specialized training that these
animals require in these experiments, their accomplishments are invalid.68 Test animals
are run through tens if not hundreds of trials of the experiment before they are able to
move on to the next stage or before the experiment concludes. However, many of these
studies occur in unnatural, human environments to which the test subjects are not
adapted. Just as they are learning to navigate this novel environment, so too do young
human children learn to navigate our society. Our first four or five years of life could
even be considered our training period for our life. Therefore, I do not believe that
specialized testing should be used to discount the accomplishments of these animals.
Growing up, culture helps us adapt to mature in specialized ways, many of which
allow us to develop our intelligence. One of these tools is time, which is entirely
culturally created and learned. It’s strange to think of time as a tool, but it plays such an
essential role in recalling our memories. When you fall into a pattern at work, every day
can seem to blend together when nothing particularly of note happens. But having the
context of whether an event occurred last week or this Tuesday is immensely helpful
when trying to reconstruct a memory. However, memory is not always associated with
exact time tags.69 Instead, people will use significant events in their life as major markers
from which they can approximate the occurrence of an event.70 71 Roberts, a Canadian
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psychologist, argues that because animals do not have clocks or calendars to act as the
foundational major memory marker, their ability to reconstruct memory is less
effective.72 “If animals do not have the benefit of this acquired temporal framework, they
may be ‘stuck in time’ and thus unable to experience episodic memories from memories
for the succession of events and plan future activities.” 73 This mindset highlights the
ridiculous and unnecessarily rigorous standard scientists set for test animals. As our
pigeons showed us, having a human perception of time is unessential for the success of
episodic memory.
The intellectual power of other organisms has been underestimated for decades
yet studies like these are shifting our perspective. We are not alone in our ability for
episodic memory. However, too many studies of animal intelligence rely on arbitrary
human standards. If animals needed specific time, they would have it. Animals only have
the abilities they need to survive.
Episodic memory has clear implications on our survival and his made great
contributions to humans’ colonization of the planet. One could argue that it is this
capacity which has led to the development and modification of certain tools and
behaviors. It’s the mindset of “this wasn’t efficient, how could I improve next time?” But
we are not alone in this ability. If animals have the capacity to remember past events and
anticipate the future, then they have the ability to suffer. By setting unnecessary standards
for episodic memory, we are invalidating this capacity for suffering, thus facilitating the
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continued exploitation of other animals. More studies must be done to promote studies,
which demonstrate that other animals have the capacity for episodic memory. For it is
only through the recognition of these abilities that people will feel motivated to reduce
other animals’ suffering. That’s a goal worth planning for.
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Chapter 3: Theory of Mind
In middle school, I tried to be everybody. I didn’t know who I was or what I liked,
but I knew who I wanted my friends to be. I, like many other middle schoolers before me,
wanted to be in with the popular crowd. They ran our school, not in the dominating and
cruel way that seemed common in other schools. Instead they were sly, smart, and suave.
I desperately wanted to be a part of it. I tried changing my clothes, thinking that if I
dressed like them, I would start to be like them. It didn’t work. I tried copying their
mannerisms, their phrases, anything that I thought would be the ticket to success. But
nothing worked. Why? Because it wasn’t me. No matter how hard I tried, I couldn’t
change who I was. I say, “who I was” because I have changed. From middle school to
high school to college, from year to year, to sometimes month by month. I am constantly
discovering parts of myself I didn’t know existed and strengthening other parts that I
value. This growth is an essential part of what it means to be human.
This detailed knowledge of oneself is called theory of mind. This concept was
created by David Premack, who trained Sarah the chimpanzee to understand symbolic
language.74 Theory of mind refers to an individual's ability to recognize themselves in
both mind and body.75 It also speaks to an individual's ability to recognize others and
their beliefs. It makes evolutionary sense to be aware of one’s own thoughts and desires
as allows you to move through our environment in a more intentional way. As a result of
these benefits, it would seem logical that this self-awareness would be found elsewhere in
the animal kingdom. Yet scientists have been slow to collect supporting data. As a result,
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the myth that humans’ individuality is unique throughout the animal kingdom has been
allowed to persist.
It was not until only fifty years ago that a study was developed to explore
animals’ ability to recognize themselves. In 1970, Gordon Gallup Jr. developed the
famous “mirror test” which has been replicated around the world and across species
numerous times since its origin.76 During the first iteration of this study, chimpanzees
were given a full-length mirror in their enclosure and were allowed to become
accustomed to it, and their reflection in it, for ten days. On the eleventh day, they were
anesthetized and were given a small, odorless, non-irritating, red mark on their face.
After they had awoken, Gallup put the mirror back in the cage and waited. He hoped that
the chimpanzees would touch their face more after noticing the mark, which would
indicate that they could identify themselves and recognize the change in their appearance.
And that’s just what happened. The chimpanzees touched their face four times more after
they had been marked as compared to before.77 This self-awareness was a
groundbreaking discovery and paved the way for the identification of other self-aware
animals including capuchins and Asian elephants.78 79
While these results are immensely encouraging, some scientists have found some
major critiques with the methodology. Some believe that the animals’ ability to recognize
themselves only demonstrates a “concept of their own body” rather than a “person
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concept.” 80 Essentially this means that the animals have only made the connection that
their motions and actions correspond with what they see in the mirror but they have not
connected this body to their unique mind. To specifically set the standard as a “person
concept” highlights our homocentrism by setting humans as the standard of selfrecognition. Does self-recognition look the same across all species?
Species will respond differently to the mirror test due to species-specific
behaviors or priorities. For example, monkeys such as macaques have consistently failed
the mirror test. Monkeys perceive eye contact as a threat; therefore, they will actively
choose to avoid looking into the mirror. Because they do not allow themselves the
prolonged experimentation and interaction with the mirror that other animals do, they are
unable to recognize themselves.81 However, without this species-specific knowledge, one
would assume that this failure was a result of a lack of intelligence rather than an
unrelated behavioral pattern.
Similarly, even if an animal does successfully pass the mirror test, it does not
definitively indicate that they are self-aware. The logic of the mirror test has been
described as follows: “If you can recognize yourself in a mirror, then you can identify the
object reflected in the mirror as yourself. If you can understand the object in the mirror as
yourself, then you know who you are. If you know who you are, you are self-conscious.
Therefore, if you can recognize yourself in a mirror, then you are self-conscious.” 82
Essentially this suggests, that the act of recognizing one’s own body does not have a
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direct correlation with recognizing one's own mind. This is a valid concern that can
become significantly more important if the experiment is not catered to the specific test
animal. Perhaps the macaque could watch its body as it played in front of the mirror and
could notice that its actions paralleled that of the reflection in the mirror. But without
being able to look into its own face, it could not associate its identity with this reflection,
thus demonstrating how an individual could recognize their mind but not their body.
Despite these obstacles, mirror tests have provided valuable insight into the minds of
other animals and have given us a strong foundation on which to build future studies of
self-awareness.
But self-awareness isn’t only concerned with identifying the connection between
one’s body and mind but also monitoring one’s consciousness. Humans have the
powerful ability to recognize the limitations on our knowledge: we know what we do not
know. This plays itself out countless times throughout the day. Whether you pick up an
article on a topic you are curious about, ask a question for clarification, choose what jobs
to apply to, or choose not to eat something you cannot identify, you are constantly
making decisions in your life based on the known scope of your knowledge. But can
other animals do the same?
In order to explore whether macaques were also able to acknowledge the extent of
their knowledge they were given a delayed matching test. After being presented with a
symbol the monkeys were forced to wait varying amounts of time before being given the
opportunity to identify the symbol they were initially presented. They were given three
options: pressing the same symbol (after which they would be given a high-value
reward), the incorrect symbol (for which they would be given no reward), and finally an
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option which allowed the monkey to decide whether or not to take the test, (which would
give them a less valuable reward). As the gap between the presentation of the initial
image and the selection option widened, the monkeys would more consistently select the
option to opt out. By selecting this option, the macaques demonstrated that they knew
what they didn’t know.83 Some may argue that rather than demonstrating that the
monkeys could analyze their knowledge, the monkeys had merely been trained to seek
out the food rewards. However, as the correct key would produce a more favorable
reward, it was in the monkeys’ best interest to be correct rather than opt out.84 But it is
not only monkeys who share this capacity with us: both dolphins and rats were also found
to share these abilities. These results demonstrate that humans are not the only creatures
that can observe and analyze their own minds.
But how do animals feel about these thoughts? This concept refers to an animal’s
consciousness, which is the subjective interpretation of one’s experiences.85 Scientists
have studied many aspects of other animals’ brains without ever answering the question
of what it feels like to be an animal with these thoughts and abilities. Our consciousness
ties emotion to our actions and defines how we live our lives. This who we are on an
individual level, leading some to argue that it defines us as humans. Some scientists have
agreed to resist this dominant belief and have created The Cambridge Declaration of
Consciousness in Non-Human Animals which states:
Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical
neurochemical and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with
the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of
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evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological
substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all
mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess
these neurological substrates.86
Adopting this mindset has important implications on research. Scientists no longer have
to prove the existence of animal consciousness - a task that could be endless and
constantly be critiqued. Instead, they are now leaving themselves open to the idea that
animal consciousness exists but may adopt different forms than those seen in humans.
The challenges avoided with this mindset can be summarized as follows:
When an animal isn’t part of our social circle, we’re not in a position to see that
individual as conscious the way we are with other humans. And since for various
reasons we may be unable to take some species into our social circle, on the noninferential approach we would remain without a means for deciding whether or
not such individuals are conscious.” 87
It is immensely challenging to free ourselves from these biases but it is essential if we
are to learn more objectively about our fellow animals.
So how can we, with our human biases, ever presume to know what is occurring
in the mind of another animal? The act of mindreading is known as theory of mind. This
is the capacity which provides us with the ability to predict or manipulate others’
behavior, help others, or satisfy our curiosity.88 89 In order to fully embody the concept of
theory of mind, an individual must be able to read another’s mind effectively in order to
infer another’s beliefs and how they perceive the world around them.90 The uncertainty in
this topic lies in the differences between seeing and believing. For example, someone can
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see a tree when they through perception, but they can only believe they see a tree through
belief. While perception holds more certainty than belief, it still does not take correctness
into account. So, you can say you see a tree, but perhaps it is a mere mirage. These
actions allow someone to recognize others as independent agents who make their own
decisions, a belief that many humans do not attribute to animals. Due to our limited
perspective, many of the tests for theory of mind have involved an animal, usually a
chimpanzee, predicting a human’s mind. If we as humans are struggling to analyze what
is occurring in the minds of these test species, then how are we to presume they can
understand what we are thinking as humans?
Despite this homocentric perspective, studies regarding other animals’ theory of
mind have challenged our claims of human uniqueness. Many of these studies followed a
similar pattern of a test subject having to indicate the “knower” as opposed to the
“guessers.” In one highly repeated model, a chimpanzee was allowed to watch a trainer
(the “knower”) hide food in a container. After the food was out of sight, the three
“guessers” would enter the enclosure and proceed to point to different containers they
believed would hold the food. Only the “knower” would point to the container with
food.91 By the end of the experiment, all four chimpanzees could consistently indicate
which trainer was the “knower.”92 This is significant as the chimpanzees were able to
understand that the “knower” was the only trainer in the room during the time of the food
hiding and consequently, they were the only one who could possibly know where the
food was hidden.
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But maybe the chimpanzee was just pointing at the trainer they saw holding the
food rather than the trainer they believed to have seen the food. Not necessarily. In order
to address this concern, the experimenters ran another round of experiments in which all
trainers were in the room during the baiting. The catch? The three “guessers” had to keep
bags over their head as the food was being hidden.93 Had the monkeys only been pointing
at the trainer they associated with food, this would have been an immensely challenging
shift. However, the chimpanzees continued to point correctly at the “knower.”94 This
demonstrated with more certainty that chimpanzees were able to predict the perceptions
and beliefs of other individuals.
This experiment relied heavily on a manufactured experience between the
chimpanzees and their caretakers. How well would chimpanzees be able to recreate these
prediction abilities with an individual of the same species? One model explored whether
a submissive chimpanzee could anticipate the thoughts of a dominant chimpanzee with
regards to food.95 There were two experiments made using this model. In the first
experiment, a dominant chimpanzee was allowed to hide food while being secretly
watched by a subordinate chimpanzee. In this scenario, the subordinate chimpanzee was
seen rushing for the hidden food. The subordinate chimpanzee predicted that the
dominant chimpanzee would suspect no reason to hurry to their food as they believed it
was hidden secretly, therefore providing an opportunity for the subordinate chimpanzee
to rush in and claim it.96 Here, it is important to note that in chimpanzee society, whoever
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touches food first has claim over it.97 Similarly promising evidence was gathered from
the second scenario. Here, a dominant chimpanzee was allowed to store food but was
now fully aware that they were being observed. In this scenario, the chimpanzee who hid
the food was observed to pretend to dig up their food elsewhere, as if to distract and
confuse the watching chimpanzee who they understood were aware of the food’s
location.98 Through both of these experiments, we are able to see exciting evidence of
theory of mind carried out between individuals of the same species within a lab.
But what of wild animals? This artificial environment has the potential danger of
altering behaviors in a way that could potentially dramatically affect results. For example,
in 1990, Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth, two American psychologists, concluded
from lab tests that macaques could not predict the knowledge of other members of their
species.99 However, research conducted with a population of wild macaques found that
these monkeys could in fact understand what others saw, heard and knew.100
Unfortunately, they could not find evidence that the monkeys could predict what others
believed.101 Here, the irony is that humans were struggling to understand the beliefs
systems of other organisms. Instead of leaving the point open for further discussion,
Lindsay Drayton and Laurie Santos said rather conclusively that due to the macaques’
inability to predict beliefs, some aspects of theory of mind must be uniquely human.102
This is a rather dramatic position to take on the basis of one study of a single species.
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Adopting this limited mindset affects our capacity to learn of the intelligence of other
organisms as the lens through which we view evidence will be inherently skewed.
The ability to recognize another individual’s knowledge is an essential first step in
the learning process. “To teach one must recognize a difference between one’s own
knowledge and someone else’s knowledge and then take explicit steps to redress this
imbalance.”103 If we as humans do not believe that other animals offer any unique or
valuable new intellect, then we will either not seek it out or will ignore evidence that
states the contrary. A key ability of learning is understanding how to apply newly
acquired information to a flexible range of situations.
Despite the odds, evidence has been found of social learning in animals. Social
learning in particular provides an individual with context for their information. It is
defined as “learning about stimuli, objects, or events…. [and] whether to attach a positive
or negative value to them by virtue of their relationships with other objects and
events.”104 Social learning demonstrates an individual’s ability to think independently
and flexibly even in the absence of their teacher. The vast majority of learning you have
done in your life is social learning. As a child, you are impressionable in order to absorb
information that will shape your world. As an adult, you make your judgements about the
world more independently, but the powerful influence of your peers and community
continues to linger throughout your life. In fact, you can teach an old dog new tricks.
Such was the case for a community of Japanese macaques who was wholly affected by
the actions of one young individual. An 18-month-old female began washing the sand off
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of the potatoes prior to eating them.105 This action, while simple, was revolutionary as it
made this delicious food even more palatable. As others learned the benefits of washing
sweet potatoes prior to their consumption, the habit spread throughout the population by
both young and old.106 This process relied on observing and mimicking knowledgeable
individuals in order make their actions more effective, even in the absence of their
teacher.
The manner in which chimpanzees teach their young to crack nuts also speaks to
their capacity for social learning. Knowledgeable adults have been seen leaving ideal nutcracking rocks near a pile of nuts in order to encourage their young to practice this
important skill. Once the young begin to practice, adults will correct their motions if they
are being inefficient or ineffective.107 108 These intentional actions demonstrate the adults’
understanding of the adolescents’ naivety, thus demonstrating their ability to read others’
minds.
These complex perceptions of self and others have important implications on
conservation. Recognizing the individuality of other animals could have the power to,
dare I say it, humanize them. These organisms have emotions, relationships, and
individual identities that mirror those seen in humans. These discoveries make it
unconscionable to continue the exploitation of other animals and their habitat as we are
directly impacting conscious, thoughtful individuals. In fact, these actions should weigh
on our conscious. We are individuals capable of theory of mind. We cannot selectively
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pick which individuals we can recognize and feel empathy for; therefore, if we are to
make this a standard for “intelligence” then we must use this ability to its full extent. We
must recognize other animals as the valuable individuals that they are.

46

Conclusion
As a child, I considered the Natural History Museum my second home. I would
spend hours upon hours, wandering the halls and peering deep into each diorama,
wondering what it would be like to be that animal. I would latch onto the tiny details as if
they were clues that would reveal this hidden world. Standing in front of the dimly lit
Arctic Wolf diorama, the northern lights glowing above, I could almost feel the chill of
the December air, almost hear the ragged breathing of my pack as we glided silently over
the snow, almost feel the wild, unrestrained freedom of the hunt. And when I tired of this
adventure, I would move to the next. What would it be like to be a leopard, curled
invisibly into a tree? A bear fishing for salmon in a pristine river? A loon calling
mournfully at sunset? A seal swirling gracefully in the surf? These were dreams I
explored endlessly, always hoping to one day know the secrets of these animals. But it
was not meant to be.
Despite the incredible breadth of our knowledge, the human perspective is
limited. Acclaimed British-Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously stated:
“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”109 Lions have a unique worldview
that reflects their own species-specific priorities. Although we may try to hypothesize
what these may be, we can only ever be a human pretending to be a lion. By fitting this
information into our human perspective, we lose its essential meaning. While we can
never conclude with certainty what is occurring in the minds of other animals, it is
important to recognize our commonalities.
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However, the culture that we have created does not leave room for the recognition
of other animals’ prowess. Through the repeated telling of the narrative of humans versus
nature, a dualism is created. This dualism separates us from our environment in such a
way that we become comfortable attempting to analyze and dominate it, as if we will not
be impacted by our own actions. This brazen attitude has led to the destruction of our
environment and the extinction of countless species. Allowing the dualism to persist
between humans and other animals is to consent to the continued abuse of other animals.
In order to end this pattern of violence, humans must recognize that we are not
superior in our abilities. Humans share numerous intellectual capacities with other
animals, including our capacities for language, episodic memory, and theory of mind.
These abilities have provided humans with the capacity to dominate the planet with
unprecedented speed. Ironically, the intellectual capacities with which we have justified
our actions are the same abilities we share with other animals. Our species’ intelligence
does not make us superior, but rather demonstrates our interconnectedness with animals
around us.
David Premack, the primatologist, questioned whether animal and human
intelligence are concentric or overlapping circles.110 If our intelligence is concentric, it is
assumed that human intelligence would encompass that of animals, suggesting that all
animal intellectual capacities are accessible to, and demonstrated by, humans. By
contrast, the overlapping circle metaphor suggests that humans and animals may share
certain abilities with each featuring their own traits. This question can quite simply
answered through color. Other animals are able to see portions of the color spectrum that
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humans cannot, including infrared and ultraviolet.111 While the photoreceptors in the
animals’ eyes are responsible for detecting the color, their brains also must be capable of
interpreting these signals. These animals consequently have a different worldview than us
and therefore have different types of knowledge, demonstrating that the intelligence of
humans and other animals could be modeled by overlapping circles rather than concentric
circles.
Recognizing that other animals are capable of human-like intellect as well as
unique forms of knowledge could be an effective tool for their conservation. One
challenge of the conservation movement is encouraging people to feel responsibility for
topics which may not immediately pertain to them or their wellbeing. People like causes
that feel relatable. This trend can be seen quite clearly through the IUCN Red List. The
Red List uses scholarly research to determine the threat level of tens of thousands plants
and animals. Unfortunately, of the more than 91,523 species currently on the Red List
50% are vertebrates (with the other half representing the three categories of invertebrates,
plants, and fungi).112 Mammals represent 12% of recorded vertebrates. Humans have an
affinity for animals that remind us of ourselves; however, this preference alone is not
enough to effectively conserve all threatened species.113 Using intelligence in order to
demonstrate our similarities to other animals could be an effective tool in animal
conservation by fostering a common connection between these two entities, human and
other animals, which have long seemed at odds with each other. Creating an inclusive
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community with other animals by means of our similar characteristics could allow others
to see that our future and the future of other animals is intrinsically linked.
In order to level the playing field for other animals, we must first objectively
observe their intelligence. As we have seen throughout our look into animal cognition,
many tests of animal intelligence have depended heavily on human standards or a human
worldview. No longer should we test animals’ capacity for language by teaching them
our language. Instead, we must go to them. A larger proportion of studies of animal
linguistics should occur within the animal’s natural environment and within their own
language. How are we ever to learn of their true abilities if we are constantly tainting data
with our own expectations? These are expectations that concern with how we think the
study species should act. These are dangerous assumptions to make as we are dooming
many species to failure. By not taking into account animals’ species-specific behaviors,
may be forcing them to play a losing game. Future studies of animal intelligence should
take greater care to specifically catered to the idiosyncrasies and preferences of each
study species. Additionally, scientists must go into these studies with an open mind, for
animal intelligence is not a one-size-fits-all. Being flexible could open up whole new
worlds of knowledge which we had never previously considered.
Eliminating bias terminology, such as “instinct” from studies of animal cognition
can further increase objectivity. “Instinct” has long been used to discount animal
intelligence. For example, some scientists argue that certain tool-use behaviors are Not
representations of intelligence as they are merely the result of simple biological
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impulses.114 All of our actions are merely impulses from the brain; therefore, all actions
of humans or animals could be described as “biological programming.” However, a
human would never describe their own actions in this way due to the perceived separation
between humans and nature. Those who believe themselves to be superior to nature may
assume they can overcome their “instincts.” In fact, in one instance where my friend
jumped at a loud noise, she laughed it off by saying “that’s my monkey brain in action!”
To submit to one’s instincts is to become animal-like, which in turn is seen a degradation
of oneself. Rather than believing animals to be less valuable than ourselves, we should
appreciate the diversity of forms of intelligence they represent and the unique
perspectives which arise from these ways of thinking.
However, relying on intelligence to create these connections is only crutch.
Intelligence represents a single evolutionary strategy and therefore cannot be held as the
standard for all animals. Therefore, we cannot rely on intelligence as the only indicator of
an animal’s worthiness. Instead, humans should learn to acknowledge animals’ inherent
worth. This is a significantly more challenging request as it requires humans to become
humbler. We do not live in the homocentric world which we have aspired to create.
Instead, we are members of a complex and fragile web of ecosystems. Just as every
species fills a role within an ecosystem, so too must humans find a niche. Fortunately, we
have the power to choose which role we want to play in the environment: pest or
umbrella species. We have heard of a keystone species, but what is an umbrella species?
These are charismatic organisms which, when conserved, can in turn save numerous
other species. Here, we are allowed to indulge ourselves. Through our intellectual
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knowledge of the complexity of ecosystems and specific species, we can chose to become
an umbrella species by protecting other animals from the harm of our pest-like past.
While important work in conservation is being done, much of our society is continuing
on the path of humans as a parasitic pest. While humans certainly have had a
disproportionate effect on our planet, if humans were to disappear, the ecosystems we
inhabit would not just continue, they would thrive.115 We are nonessential and therefore
should not continue to prioritize ourselves over animals. The planet cannot afford to
support our homocentrism anymore.
But we have a long way to go before we can acknowledge animals’ inherent
worth. For now, I will continue to dream myself into the minds of other animals in order
to see the world through their perspective. Opening ourselves up to these perspectives
will open up entirely new worlds our human minds could never dream of, for we should
never stop learning. It’s the smart thing to do.
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Appendix A: Exploring Humorous Rhetoric
Growing up in New York City, one acquires a particular distaste for pigeons due to their
unique ability to constantly be in the wrong place at the wrong time. If you are running late for an
appointment and already must dodge tourists, taxis, and strollers, the pigeons will always be the
last straw. They will meander slowly in front of you, pecking at the cement and fixing one beady
eye on you challengingly, as if to say “this is my ground, lady, and I am not budging.” No matter
which way you swerve, there a pigeon will be. If you have the misfortune of encountering a flock
on a narrow sidewalk, do not slow or show fear. They can smell it. Keeping a confident pace and
a slightly ducked head will make the flock part like the Red Sea and keep your head mostly free
from pigeon fallout.
I cannot help but admire the pigeon’s audacity in traffic. In true New York fashion, they
will J-walk, weaving between cars until they settle in the perfect location right in the middle of
the road. The ideal time for this activity always seems to be during a green light, when there's a
moving vehicle, an angry taxi driver, and a SUV all gunning for the first position at the next red
light. They eagerly take the front-row seat in the action and wait. And wait. And wait. Until both
the driver and any onlookers have already deemed the pigeon dead, when suddenly it will lazily
fly out of danger and flutter softly to a new spot only two feet away.
During moments like these, it seems unfathomable that such a clueless creature could
have figured out how to distribute its species so thoroughly around the planet. Pigeons’ survival
instincts are perhaps more complex than they appear on the surface. During a 2017 study, Sasaki
and Brio discovered that pigeons are capable of Cumulative Cultural Evolution (or CCE). CCE is
a pattern that has previously only been attributed to humans due to the complex problem-solving
skills required to learn and acquire new efficient behaviors over time. During this study, homing
pigeons (Columbia livia) were allowed to fly individually, in flocks, or were strategically paired
57

with an older more experienced pigeon during their flights. Each pigeon has their own
idiosyncratic way of flying from point the study location to their home. When flying in a flock,
the average of these routes is used. However, when an older pigeon is paired with a younger one,
the younger pigeon begins to adopt the route of the older one. Over the course of several
generations, the paired pigeons learned and passed on the fastest routes home from the study
location. This study had three major findings. First, Pigeons are able to contribute information to
their overall flock’s knowledge. Next, pigeons can create solutions to problems through their
collective intelligence. FInally, homing pigeons are able to weigh the pros and cons of different
approaches to a problem in order to determine the most efficient solution. The presence of CCE
in pigeons suggests that these animals’ may have the capacity for more complex intelligence than
were previously believed.
Animal intelligence can take on different forms than humans but that does not reduce its
value. While pigeons may have the ability to improve their collective intelligence over the course
of generations, they still stand in front of oncoming traffic and get hit. Does the frequency of the
latter outweigh the significance of the former? Intelligence is frequently used to determine worth;
however, as can be seen in homing pigeons, a species may exhibit several types of “complex”
intelligence while still retaining more “basic” patterns of thinking. Therefore, intelligence should
not be used to determine a species’ worth due to the diversity of forms it may take.
Of course, pigeons are not in need of any conservation, but if this animal, which is
commonly considered a pest, is capable of complex social structures then who knows what else
lies below the surface. Humans are not the most worthy or complex species on this planet and
therefore we do not have a right to degrade our environment. Perhaps we can take a lesson from
pigeons and realize we can learn from the mistakes of our ancestors. We must conserve our
environment and all the species within it while we still can.
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Appendix B: Podcast
Labelling someone as a bird brain suggests that they are dim-witted, incompetent,
and absent-minded… all things a PROPER human should NOT be. The idea that a
human would have anything in common with such a puny creature is almost
unfathomable…. Or is it?
Humans always like to tell the myth that our intelligence is unprecedented and
there has never been any other animal to have a brain like ours. It certainly cannot be
denied that humans’ minds are exceptionally powerful, but we may not be quite as unique
as we like to believe.
Take for example, a raven. In a 2010 study, Swedish cognitive zoologist Mathias
Osvath tested ravens for their ability to plan for the future by examining whether they
could learn how to use a tool to acquire a reward even after a delay. He provided the test
birds with a small stone which could be used to extract some dog food from a box. He
allowed them to repeat this trial several times until he felt they were comfortable with
how it worked. Then would provide the raven with a selection of objects, including the
same stone tool, without the box. 15 minutes after the raven had selected their tool, they
would be presented with the box of food where they could attempt to dislodge the food
reward… 78% of the time the raven would select the correct tool because of their
previous experience with the food box, even with a delay.
This behavior is called episodic memory, meaning these animals have the ability
to learn from past experiences in order to prepare for future ones… an ability previously
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believed to only be had by humans…. Maybe being called a bird brain isn’t so bad after
all.
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Appendix C: Three-page draft
A bird’s brain is notoriously underappreciated. There is a common misconception
that its size is determinant of its abilities; however, this is not the case. However, recent
studies have revealed that many bird species have similar capacities for future planning
as humans.
In order to test the theory that ape-like creatures are not the only ones capable of
thinking outside the present moment, an American neurologist Cristina Atance and
Canadian psychologist Daniela O’Niell studied western scrub jays ability to plan for food
scarcity. A Western scrub jay (Aphelocoma californica) was contained within a small
compartment (A) with three chambers, each closed off from each other and was denied a
meal in the evening and for the first several hours of the new day. During the late
morning and afternoon, the dividers between the chambers were removed to reveal
powdered pine nuts in the middle compartment, which the jays eagerly ate. That evening,
they were stored in a different compartment (C) and were denied dinner once again but
were promptly provided with powdered pine nuts in the morning. Once again, the
dividers revealed powdered pine nuts for them to consume in the afternoon. This pattern
repeated for several days until the researchers determined that the birds had been
accustomed to the feeding schedule for each compartment. At this point they began
providing the birds with whole pine nuts in the afternoon. This change may seem subtle,
but it is immensely revealing about the intellectual capabilities of this species.
This study was based on a type of intellect called “episodic memory.” Episodic
memory refers to an organism’s ability to recall memories and potentially use this
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information to proceed in the future. For example, you may have an episodic memory of
an exam you were underprepared for. Remembering this time may leave you feeling
nervous and upset, despite the amount of time that separates you from this event. You
may recall these feelings when you are gearing up for another test or other project and
feel motivated to avoid this experience by being better prepared. This is a capacity we as
humans may take for granted as it is so essential to the day-to-day function of our lives it
can seem impossible to even imagine how one could function without it. Raby and his
team wanted to explore whether this capacity could be seen in scrub jays, which must
recall information such as their food storage locations.
The jays, equipped with their bird brains understood the significance of the whole
pine nuts and began storing them in the cage they associated with hunger (A). They were
able to recall their experience of discomfort each morning in cage A and realize they
could cache the pine nuts from cage B in cage A so they could be prepared for the
morning. What was perhaps most remarkable about this study was that birds who knew
they would spend the night in compartment C (where they were provided breakfast in the
morning) were less likely to store the pine nuts because they did not associate that
location with hunger in the same way as they did with cage A. This reveals that the
caching of the pine nuts was not the norm but instead was a direct adaptation to the study
conditions in cage A. Raby’s research team concluded that scrub jays are capable of
episodic memory… an intellectual ability which has previously only been attributed to
humans.
Ravens, too, are forcing us to rethink what intellectual abilities are “unique” to
humans. In 2010, a Swedish cognitive zoologist Mathias Osvath tested ravens for their
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own episodic thinking capabilities. He provided each bird with a small stone and a box.
When the stone was inserted into the box, it would reward the bird with dog kibble. Once
familiarized with this process after several trials, Osvath would introduce them to a new
challenge. Instead of giving the ravens the correct tool upfront, he provided them with an
array of tools, only one of which would be successful in dislodging the food. After the
ravens selection of the tool, Osvath would wait 15 minutes before presenting the box
containing their (potential) food reward. A remarkable 78% of the time, the ravens would
select the correct tool.
This study has two significant implications. First, these birds have the capacity to
recall on their previous experiences with the food box and were able to successfully
determine which tool they would need for their future task. The act of dislodging food
from a box with a stone is, unsurprisingly, not a challenge they encounter in the wild. So
how were ravens able to know what to do with the objects provided for them? These
birds have mental flexibility which allow them to project their knowledge from one
situation (tool use in the wild to acquire food), onto this unique situation in an effective
way. Osvath’s study also demonstrates that ravens are capable of planning for the future.
Corvids are the only known non-human family of organisms that is capable of future
planning. When provided with selection of tools, the ravens had to recall past trials with
the pebble and box, select the correct pebble from the tools in front of them, and hold
onto the tool for 15 minutes, before finally having the opportunity to use the tool and
collect the reward. This behavior demonstrates a remarkable capacity in thought and
planning.
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Future planning has clear contributions to humans’ ability to colonize the planet.
By having the power to learn from previous experiences and alter behavior for the future,
changes can be made rapidly in a person’s lifetime. One could argue that it is this
capacity which has lead to the development and modification of certain tools. It’s the
mindset of “this wasn’t efficient, how could I change it to be more effective next time?”
But now we have learned we are not alone. The power of a bird’s brain has been
underestimated for decades yet studies like these are shifting our perspective. One could
question that if humans have used this capacity to develop complex technology, then why
haven’t birds? The sarcastic answer would be that a bird has no use for an iPhone. Of
course this is wildly extreme but it conveys an important message, which is that birds
have not developed human technology because they have no need to. They have, and are,
evolving the technology which are most useful for them based on their own individual
and communal needs and experiences. They are able to learn how to use stones to receive
a reward or how to store food to prevent hunger because these are experiences which they
encounter in their lives. Their bird brains are functioning just as they should and perhaps
even more similarly to ours than we currently know.
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